Growth pole is the concentration of technically advanced industries that stimulate economic development in associated businesses and industries. These concentrations of industries often affect the economies of geographical areas outside their immediate regions.
The Growth Pole Theory
A third, but less knownmodel of growthwas worked out in the 1950s by the Frenchman, Fancois Perroux. Perroux divided industry as a whole into two types of sub-sector: the dynamic sub-sectors, so called ‘propellant’ industries: and the non-dynamic, ‘impelled’ industrial sectors, which had to be driven forward by the dynamic sectors. This division also had a spatial aspect in that there was a tendency to concentrate the dynamic sub-sectors in small geographical enclaves, while the others were spread out in backward regions, whose growth and development totally depended on their linkages with the growth poles.
With this emphasis on both the sector wise and the spatial concentration of growth, Perroux came to act as a kind of forerunner for the many empirical analyses that have
since been undertaken of such tendencies. It is today a conventional widespread conception that the countries in the Third World, with a few exceptions such as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan — are all characterised by concentrations of growth in certain sectors and certain geographical enclaves.
It is of great benefit to mention here that this strategy of the growth pole was one of the earliest development initiatives that Zambia implemented in its search to bring about balanced development. The specific programme under which this was implemented was known as the ‘Intensive Development Zones’. Under this programme certain areas of potential growth were identified. The idea was to pump a lot of investment in those areas so that the effects of growth from them could have spill-over effects over a certain period of time. In the long run, the entire country would come to benefit from this approach.
The Growth Pole Theory
In contrast to Perroux’s and Hirschman’s recommendation; the concentration has rarely been optimal as seen from the perspective of the theories of unbalanced growth.
The concentrations observed in the third world do not, generally reflect strategic imbalances in Hirschman’s conception, or development-promoting growth rate poles in Perroux’s terminology. Rather, they represent isolated growth spots which may be interlinked and integrated into global networks but which, at the same time, have not induced growth in non-dynamic sectors of the surrounding backward areas.
Neo-Marxism theories of underdevelopment and dependency appeared during the 1950s, partly as a reaction against the growth and modernization theories, partly as the outcome of a long-standing debate concerning the impact of imperialism. The early Neo-Marxist theories were primary known as dependency theories., They were to a large extent influenced by the Latin American structuralists and their analyses of the trade relations between the economically backward countries and the highly industrialised countries.
Neo-Marxist Theories of Underdevelopment and Dependency
With respect to the theoretical heritage from the debate on imperiali5rn, it may be of interest to note that Marx had concerned himself with this issue as early as the 1850s. In articles in publications such as the New York Tribute, Marx tried to assess what would be the long-term impact on the European colonization of South Asia.
In this context, he arrived at the including local small-scale manufacturing, and set in motion a significant exploitation of the colonial areas; but on the other hand, he believed that the European penetration would at the same time remove basic obstacles to British intervention as directly promoting economic transformation. This applied especially to the building and expansion of material infrastructure, the introduction of the plantation economy monetization of commodity exchange, and the initial establishment of modern industry with its commutant wage labour (cf. Marx and Engels, 1972).
In other words, British rule implied destruction and exploitation in the short-term perspective, but construction and creation and creation of essential material preconditions for the colonial areas’ later transformation to capitalism – and thus, according to Marx, genuine societal development. It may be added that. Mar later toned down the constructive aspects of British rule in South Asia. He further asserted that the British colonization of Ireland had only destructive effects.
The interesting point in the present context is to note the wide span in Marx’s own conceptions, because this span has paved the way for very different interpretations within the Marxist research tradition. One of the theorists who has championed the view that imperialism has promoted development in the Third World is Bill Warreo.
We shall look at his main argument later in this chapter. But first we shall deal with the Neo-Marxist mainstream and focus on some of the several theorists who have vehemently rejected this interpretation and instead asserted that imperialism has actively underdeveloped the peripheral societies, or a very least obstructed their development.
These theories , most of whom may be regarded as proponents of dependency theory in one form or another, have further claimed that not only imperialism and colonialism of the past, but also contemporary forms of economic imperialism have impeded progress throughout the Third World.
They argue that economic domination, as exerted by the high industrialised countries, is a much more important development, impeding factor than all the internal conditions in the backward countries that feature so prominently in the growth and modernization theories.
A fourth distinguish characteristics of developing countries is that their trade tends to be dominated by the export of primary commodities and the import of manufactured goods.
This has consequences for the terms of trade of developing countries, the distribution of the giants from trade between developed and developing countries, and the balance of payments situation, all of which may adversely affect real income per head. The trade of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean is still dominated by primary commodities. Only Asia and the Pacific have made headway in reducing dependence on commodity exports.
Exports Dominated by Primary Commodities
The barter terms of trade measure the ratio of export price to import prices. There has been a historical tendency for the terms of trade of primary goods relative to manufactured goods to deteriorate over the last 100 years or so by about 0.5 per cent per annum on average. This tendency is known in the literature as the Prebisch-Singer thesis. The falling price of exports relative to imports reduces the real income of a country because more exports have to be exchanged to obtain a given quantity of imports.
A second point to note is that the income elasticity of demand for primary commodities in world trade is less than unity, while the income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods is greater than unity. This means that as world income grows, the demand for primary commodities grows at a lower rate, but if developing countries grow at the same rate as the world economy their demand for manufactured imports grows at a faster rate.
As a consequence, developing countries specializing in the production of primary commodities suffer acute balance of payments difficulties. Often, the only means available to developing countries to adjust the balance of payments is to slow down their economies in order to reduce the growth of imports.
The prices of primary commodities are also more cyclically volatile than the price of manufactured goods. This can also cause havoc to a country’s balance of payments and its government’s tax revenue if it relies heavily on trade taxes. The resulting instability makes planning difficult and may deter private domestic investment and investment from overseas.
For all those reasons, the structure of trade poses severe problems for many developing countries and may keep countries poor than they would be if they were able to produce and export more industrial goods. It is not possible to understand the growth and development process — and the perpetuation of divisions in the world economy —without reference to the unequal trading between rich and poor countries and the balance of payments consequences of specializing in primary commodities.
In general, it seems to be the case that the more natural resources a country has, the poorer it performs. This phenomenon is referred to in the literature as the ‘curse of natural resources’ (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Gylfason, 2001). There is a very strong negative relationship and the regression coefficient of -0.0871 indicates that a country with a primary sector share 11 percentage points above the average has experienced a growth of per capita income of one percent below the average (controlling for the initial level of per capita income). This represents a substantial loss of welfare.
The same negative pattern emerges when the growth of per capita income is regressed against the export of natural resources as a share of GDP; and the negative relation persists even when controlling for other variables such as differences in the level of investment between countries, and for climate and geography.
Most countries that have grown rapidly in recent decades started as resource poor, not resource rich. There are exceptions to this general rule — countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Botswana, for example — but most of these exceptional countries have grown fast not through the exploitation of natural resources but through diversification into manufacturing industry.
Curse of natural resource
Curse of natural resource
What lies behind this‘curse of natural resource’?A number of factors fan be mentioned, which interrelate with each other, that seem to affect adversely may of the important determinants of development. Glyfason shows a negative relation across countries between the share of the primary sector in the labour force and export performance, domestic and foreign investment and education, and a positive relation with the size of external debt, the level of protection, corruption and income inequality.
We have already seen why primary production can lead to poor export performance because many natural resources are income inelastic and suffer terms of trade deterioration, by why should natural resources abundant countries neglect investment and education, and be more corrupt? There are two major explanations.
Firstly, natural resource abundance may ‘crowd-out’ other activities ‘through two mechanisms:
(1) higher wages or earnings in the natural resources sector impairing entrepreneurial activity and innovation in other sectors, and
(2) revenues from natural resources exports keeping the exchange rate artificially high which makes the rest of the economy uncompetitive.
This is known as the Dutch Disease, so named because of the effect that the discovery of natural gas in Holland in the 1960s had on the exchange rate and other sectors of the economy. Sachs and Warner (2001) test this ‘crowding out’ hypothesis across 99 countries and find a positive correlation between natural resource abundance and the domestic price level. The higher relative price level is then found to impede the export growth of manufactured goods. It could also be that a country rich in natural resources simply neglects to develop other sectors of the economy.
A second major explanation why natural resource abundance may lead to poor performance is that the rents from natural resources may be misused by politicians and bureaucrats. Democracy and the rule of law seem to be inversely related to natural resource abundance, and Gylfason (2001) shows corruption to be more widespread in natural resource abundant countries.
This is not surprising since limiting access to a resource provides a rent, and where the state owns the resource, bureaucrats,will take bribes in return for exploitation rights. Tent earners may not be interested in schooling and education, having lined their own pockets, and those of their children, without acquiring an education. Thus, rent seeking leads to low levels of expenditure on education and school enrolment. it is also the case that the primary sector of an economy does not have the same educational needs as a more diversified economy.