Category: Civic Education

Conflicts can be defined as a form of disagreement or antagonism between two or more parts, which may be individuals, societies, communities or nations. Differences in political structures and in the levels of power and access to technology, together with the ability to project that power and technology, has resulted, however, in some striking differences.

Global look at Conflict Situation

Some of the other conflicts that occurred (or continued) in the post-Cold War era were, like those in Africa, fought largely within the territory of a state that was not in complete control over its territory, and were linked to grievance or greed (or a combination of the two) with regards to power and access to resources. As in Africa, the end of the Cold War factor allowed the conditions for certain conflict to end, as in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Elsewhere, decreases in Cold War arms and financial support also forced parties to the conflict to find other means to continue fighting, although these means may have already been utilised for some time.

In several conflicts, trading in illicit drugs was a key ‘source of revenue for various factions andwarlordismthrived. This was particularly seen in connection with the trade in cocaine from Colombia, and in opium from Afghanistan and Myanmar, (otherwise known as Burma). On top of the drug trade in Colombia, kidnapping for ransom also became unusually common, and was seen as another means used by parties to conflict. Support from diasporas was also a crucial source of funding for armed groups, as seen in the rebel movement in Sri Lanka.

In certain parts of the former Soviet Union and in the former Yugoslavia, conflicts broke out as various factions jostled to fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism as an ideology. These were seen in Tajikistan, Georgia, Bosnia, Kosovo and even within Russia itself, in Chechnya.

As in manyAfrican conflicts, factions struggling to gain power and influence attempted to raise and promote ethno-nationalist identities, which were then propagated through the local media. This eventually resulted in conflict, which cemented many so-called ethnic identities, but as in many African conflicts noted in unit one, conflict was largely the result of elite manipulation of ethnic identity, not a spontaneous outburst of age-old ethnic violence that had been suppressed by the Cold War environment.

Major differences in the nature of conflict can be seen, however, when looking at conflicts involving Western powers, such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Three key differences in conflicts waged by Western countries can be noted here.

1)Such conflicts generally occur in locations far removed from the countries that wage them. The US and the UK fight in Iraq, not in the US or the UK. The conflict is likely to have considerably less effect on their home countries.

2)The technology available and use of force is far superior to that of their enemies.Cruise missiles can now accurately target a specific room in a building from thousands of kilometers away, and entire campaigns have been conducted without the use of ground troops.

3)Governments are more accountable to the people they represent.Those engaged in conflict need to heed, to a certain degree, the will of their constituencies on decisions regarding conflict, they conduct their conflict under heavy media spotlights, and are highly sensitive on any troop losses.

The terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 were seen as a turning point for Western involvement in conflict. They raised the West’s tolerance for casualties in conflict, and their willingness to initiate or involve themselves in conflict. The US government declared a ‘war on terror’ using the attacks as the justification for the invasions of Afghanistan and, in large part, Iraq (although no link between Iraq and the terrorist attacks was ever credible).

Leaders in other Western countries announced their participation in this ‘war’. Other countries (including some in Africa) also began using the phrase to describe their role in local conflicts, in an effort to gain foreign support and legitimacy. Despite having become a high-profile issue, the term ‘terrorism’ is used in a highly subjective and selective manner, and it is not clear if the so-called ‘War on Terror’ should be more of a policing matter or a military matter.

Looking At Conflict Scale

Having looked at similarities and differences in the nature of conflict between Africa and the rest of the world, let us now turn to comparisons of scale. Scale will help us determine the severity of conflicts, and lead to some of the ‘hotspots‘ in the world. There are several studies that attempt to map trends in conflict in the world, answering such questions as: has conflict increased or decreased in recent years, or which regions in the world are most prone to conflict?

They set criteria for what counts as a conflict (such as, a death toll of more than, 1,000) and then count the numbers of conflicts. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Project Plough shares conduct such studies. They have found Africa and Asia to be host to the most number of conflicts. Project ploughshares also looks at the number of countries in a particular region with conflicts, and in 1999 found the Middle East to be the most conflict-prone region in that sense.

The problem with such methods of measuring conflict is that they count all conflicts as equals. Thus, the conflict in East Timor, which resulted in roughly 1,000 deaths would be counted at the same level as the conflict in the DRC, which cost 4,000,000 lives and involved troops from as many as 8 different countries.

Should Asia be considered a more conflict-prone area than Africa simply because it has a greater number of conflicts, regardless of the size? Others, such as journalists and analysts, formulate trends in conflict (somewhat arbitrarily) based on their perceived political importance.Terrorismagainst the West thus features in very prominently in such analyses, despite the relatively minor death tolls from such attacks. Comparing the actual scale of conflicts may be a more useful method of gaining insights into trends in conflicts.

The next question is: how do we measure the scale of conflicts? There are a number of factors that we can look at to determine scale or severity of a conflict. The number of deaths caused by conflict is probably the most representative, although as noted in unit one, it is extremely difficult to determine with any accuracy the actual death toll from a conflict. The number of refugees (those who cross borders to flee from conflict) and internally displaced persons, or IDPs (those who flee conflict but remain within their own country) is another indicator.

A third indicator may be the level of humanitarian suffering associated with the conflict – is there adequate food, water, medicine, shelter and sanitation, or is there starvation and rampant disease? A fourth indicator of conflict scale may be the spillover (or danger of spillover) from the conflict to a neighbouring state.

This article will provide you with a somewhat generalised overview of how the conflicts in Africa are seen by those outside. It will focus mainly on the Western perspective, given the fact that it is the Western world that is most in a position to do something about the conflict in Africa. A more detailed look at the perspective of and response to the conflict in Africa will be provided in the following units.

Perspectives On Africa’s Place In The World

Before looking at perspectives on conflicts in Africa, it is important to first note how people view the world and the people in it. From the-human perspective, the world is extremely large, it is round and it is inhabited by billions of people. The ability of the human brain to comprehend the world and its peoples in its entirety is highly limited, and thus humans apply copious amounts of generalisation, simplification and categorization to be able to ‘understand’ it from their particular point of view.

The fact that the world is round is a problem in conceptualisation because we are unable to see it in its entirety at the one time. To overcome this, we have ‘flattened’ and stretched the world, making rectangular two-dimensional- maps that show the entire world on one page. The problem is that, however projected, such maps can never accurately show the true dimensions of the World, and inevitably involve a compromise between factors such as area, direction and distance. The Mercator projection, which was first produced in the 1500s.

remains the most-widely used map projection in much of the world. According to this projection, the further away from the equator the region is, the more it is inflated, or ‘stretched’. Thus, Europe, for example, appears larger than it actually is, which has added to the political popularity of this map. On the Mercator projection, Greenland appears larger than the African continent, despite the fact that Africa is in fact 13 times larger than Greenland. See below:

The use of the Mercator projection, and other rectangular world maps, was at last rejected by the American Cartographic Association in 1989 and 1990, but it remains popular. In 1998 the National Geographic Society adopted the use of the Winkel Tripel projection for all its world maps. This projection attempts compromise equally regarding distortions on area, direction and distance.

Attempting to ‘understand’ differences among peoples inhabiting the world is also a critical issue. Social Identity Theory holds that humans attempt to identify themselves with a particular group, which for them becomes the ‘in-group’. They then favour their ‘in-group’ over ‘out-groups’ (those belonging to groups that they perceive to be different from their group) in order to maintain or enhance their own self-esteem (Billig, 1995: 65-73). Such groups are socially constructed and may include divisions according to race, language, religion, socio-economic status, nation or state. The greater the distance, and the less available the knowledge about an ‘out-group’, the vaguer the divisions become.

Many in the Western world, for example, may have a tendency to categorise the entire continent of Africa as ‘black’, ‘poor’, and/or ‘uncivilised’, different from themselves as ‘white’, ‘wealthy’^. and ‘civilised’. To attract the necessary domestic support for the colonisation of Africa, for example, the colonisers portrayed Africa as a continent of savages, devoid of civilisation, and the ‘inconvenient’ existence of numerous major civilisations, such as those in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Congo and Senegambia, were hidden from sight and from the history books.

Without a written language of their own (with the exception of Ethiopia) and under foreign dominance, Africans were unable to secure the place of the continent in history (written by Westerners), and Africa became largely a continent without pre-colonial history and in the views of international relations, a continent without politics. Economic, military and political domination by the West of Africa has ensured that this marginalisation remains, to a certain extent, to this day.

Perspectives Of Conflicts In Africa

Narrowing the focus, how is contemporary conflict in Africa seen from the outside world? Sadly, the most appropriate response to this question is that it is not seen very much at all. Prominent policymakers focus their attention’ elsewhere, on the popular conflicts of the day. Media coverage is scant and relatively little is written by academics or the other recorders of history. The general public outside Africa (and perhaps even within Africa) knows little. about the subject.

While there may be a general impression that conflict is rife in much of the continent, conflict on other continents is usually perceived as having more importance and is given more attention. As predicted by Social Identity Theory, ‘white’ victims of conflict (such as those in the former Yugoslavia or Chechnya) will attract more attention among predominantly white populations than those with ‘black’ victims. Other forms of identification (religious and political) also give conflict in the Middle East (namely Israel-Palestine) high levels of attention.

As noted in the previous topic, death tolls from conflicts in Africa far outweigh the death tolls from any non-African conflict. But the perceived importance of a conflict rarely appears to be related to the severity or number of deaths. The ability to identify with the victims (as noted above) has generally proved to be a more important factor.

But another reason why death tolls have so little influence on perception of the importance attached to conflict is that humans are limited by their ability to comprehend the gravity of large numbers, in terms of human lives, for example. Stalin is famous for his observation that: ‘a single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic’. We suffer ‘moral dysfunction’ at a certain point, such that the huge difference, for example, between 4 million and 5 million deaths means little to us (Cohen, 2001: 189-190).

But the conflicts in Africa is not entirely hidden from view in the West. Occasionally conflicts do rise to positions of relative prominence in the West, such as Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, and, to a certain degree, Darfur in recent years. This raises such questions as:

1) why do certain conflicts rise to prominence, and

2) ‘when they do, how are they seen?

The answers to both questions depend on which group in society we are looking at (policymakers, media, or the public, for example), and these issues will be dealt with in greater detail in the following units. But in order to provide some initial food for thought, some generalisations will be provided here.

In answer to the first question, the issue of distance (both in terms of geography and social identity) is a major factor. So is the perceived importance of the region in question to the national interest. High levels of attention given by certain groups in society may also influence other groups to pay attention. If the media gives extensive coverage to a particular conflict, for example, policymakers may also feel compelled to pay attention to it.

The ability to sympathise with the victims (which is also linked to identity) is also a factor. The perception of the black victims in the conflict in Darfur as being blameless, or innocent victims means that more attention is attributed to their plight. Where all parties to the conflict are seen as bearing some of the blame for the violence (in most cases in Africa), distant observers are less likely to feel sympathy, and thus less likely to pay attention to the plight of the victims.

This leads us to the second question, when conflicts in^.Africa are seen, how are they seen? Conflicts are rarely simple affairs – the causes are usually highly complex, there may be many different factions participating, and their motives varied. Furthermore, bias and propaganda usually distort the information reaching the outside world.

For all but the most vigilant of observers, it is too much to expect that outsiders will maintain an accurate view of conflicts In Africa, together with the motives and conduct of the participants. As such, outsiders lacking knowledge of the nature of the conflict tend to simplify, generalise, and at times draw conclusions that do not necessarily reflect reality. The most obvious result of this is that conflict in Africa is generally not seen as being political in nature (as it may be seen in other regions), but instead as the result of age-old tribal hatreds and ethnic divisions.

Responses to conflict viewed in this way generally follow one of two paths:

1) Where an aggressor and an innocent victim can be clearly identified (whether rightly or wrongly), sympathy may rise and the observer may feel the need to do something;

2) where such simplistic clarity cannot be found, the conflict is categorised as tribal or ethnic ‘chaos’, helplessness sets in, and the conflict disappears from the consciousness.

Even where the people do feel the need to do something, the sheer scale or extended timeframe of the tragedy, together with the constant and emotive rallies to respond may lead to what is known as ‘compassion fatigue’, whereby the senses become overwhelmed and people feel that they don’t want to know about these distant problems anymore. It has, however, been argued that the human capacity to feel compassion is not limited, and that the phenomenon is more accurately described as ‘donor fatigue’.

We have seen the actors and some of the ways they influence each other in setting their agendas. But regardless of what these actors consider as important, the question remains, what measures against conflicts can different actors actually take in foreign nations, and often quite distant conflict zones?

The answer depends on the options available to the particular actors, but these may include: exposing and drawing attention to the conflict, lobbying, boycotting products associated with the conflict,diplomacy(or peacemaking), providing humanitarian aid, imposing sanctions on parties to the conflict, military intervention, peacebuilding, or bringing those guilty of war crimes to justice. These can be broken down into indirect measures, measures short of military intervention and military intervention.

Indirect Measures

There can be no response to conflict unless it is known. This may seem obvious, but gathering information and making the existence of a conflict known to other actors is an important first step. This is something that the media in particular can do, as can NGOs on the ground and academics.

If these actors feel strongly that it is a conflict demanding greater attention and response, they take it a step further, lobbying policymakers to take action, the public may lobby politicians through petitions, or on the streets in public demonstrations or appeals; the media may use extensive and emotive media coverage; and academics may directly advise or provide recommendations to policymakers. The public may even boycott products that are believed to be contributing to the conflict, such as diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC. For the majority of the actors who are not policymakers, this is the extent of their influence on conflict and conflict resolution.

Measures Short of Military Intervention

A more direct option is use of diplomacy in mediating between parties to a conflict (also known as peacemaking). Such mediation may appear to be usually reserved for policymakers, but certain NGOs specialising in mediation are also becoming involved in peacemaking, such as Sant’Egidio or the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Mediation enhances communication between parties, and allows parties to pressure the other side and save face when compromising. Mediators may be ‘neutral’, simply enhancing direct interaction between parties, or they may be ‘principal’, using carrots or sticks to make an agreement more attractive (Princen, 1992: 11-31).

Principal mediators usually have some direct or indirect interest in the conflict. Providing humanitarian aid to those suffering as a result of conflict is another way of becoming involved in alleviating a conflict situation. Such action, however, involves treating the symptoms of conflict, and is not generally a contributing factor to conflict resolution.

Conversely, the provision of humanitarian aid is frequently used by parties to conflict to bolster their position and in certain situations may ironically contribute to the continuation of conflict. An expansion of humanitarian aid includes what is known as peacebuilding, activity seen as linking emergency aid and long-term development assistance. to encourage parties to remain faithful to peace agreements. This includes disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of parties to conflict.

Policymakers and the public have the power to contribute to the provision of humanitarian aid. Governments, the UN and associated agencies (such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme, WFP), NGOs and even individuals may provide aid, but there are attempts to coordinate the process to avoid gaps and duplication. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) within the UN makes consolidated appeals for specific emergencies, to which countries, organisations and individuals alike are invited to pledge and donate.

This means that OCHA may decide which emergencies it feels are most in need of assistance and encourage donations, but it is up to the donor to decide which emergency response it will fund. As much as 85 percent of funding to the UNHCR and WFP is ‘earmarked’., meanirig that the donors have specified which emergency and/or which project it will fund (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 187). Thus, it appears that it is states, rather than international organisations, that have the real power in determining humanitarian aid.

A more aggressive measure is the use of economic or diplomatic sanctions to coerce belligerent parties into ending conflict. Sanctions may range from travel bans against those in key leadership positions and bans on participation in international sporting events, to weapons bans and even comprehensive trade bans. This may be done unilaterally, or as a globally coordinated measure based on a UN Security Council resolution. It may be directed at a state or a party to a conflict within a state. The effectiveness of such sanctions depends on how willing and able the neighbours of the area under sanction (and those charged with overseeing the measures) are in enforcing them.

An additional measure (although usually applied in a post-conflict situation) is the use of criminal law to attempt to bring to justice those thought to be guilty of crimes committed during a conflict. This may be done^–through ad hoc international criminal tribunals, or through the recently created International Criminal Court (ICC). There have also been attempts to bring such individuals to justice through national legal systems, even in foreign countries unrelated to the conflict itself.

Military Intervention

Where other measures have failed (or are assumed to be ineffective), military intervention may become an option. While this is a measure typically reserved for policymakers, governments facing rebellions have hired private security firms (as seen in Sierra Leone and Angola, for example), although this remains highly controversial. Within military intervention, there are a number of options at varying levels that policymakers have at their disposal. These include: the deployment of observers, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcement action.

As the key international organisation in conflict resolution, the United Nations is often criticised for perceived inaction or weak response to conflict, as if it were a powerful organisation under unified command. The UN Secretariat does not have the authority or the resources to mount any type of intervention on its own.

Its Secretary General has the power to make recommendations and to manage peacekeeping operations once they have been authorised, but not to determine the size, scope or mandate of such operations. When an intervention is authorised, he must go door to door, trying to encourage countries to voluntarily provide troops, equipment and supplies. The Secretary-General in fact has little more than moral authority in this sense and is at the mercy of the member states.

The real power lies with the UN Security Council, a gathering of five permanent (or non-elected) members who each have veto power over any decision (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) and ten non-permanent (or elected) members.

Through its resolutions, which are forged through negotiations and power politics among its members, the Security Council decides what measures are to be taken in response to conflict, be they sanctions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or even full-scale enforcement action. Furthermore, resolutions are useless without implementation, and unless a country or a group of countries volunteers to field and sustain forces, resolutions authorising such action will simply not be adopted at all.

Peacekeeping was originally intended as a confidence building measure, and peacekeepers positioned themselves between two clearly defined adversaries, with the solid consent of both parties. They were typically lightly armed and their greatest assets were their neutrality and the fact that they would not use force. Such measures were adopted under what was colloquially called ‘Chapter Six and a half’ of the UN Charter, because peacekeeping is not specifically provided for in the Charter.

Chapter Six of the UN Charter regulates peacemaking and other measures for peacefully resolving conflicts, while Chapter Seven deals with more robust responses (sanctions and interventions) to threats and breaches of the peace. With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was increasingly being employed, but peacekeepers were more often than not being sent into situations where adversaries, frontlines and consent were unclear. That is, peacekeepers were being sent where there was little peace to keep. This was seen in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, and later in Sierra Leone and the DRC.

Peacekeeping in its traditional sense was not suitable for such situations, and stronger measures, which came to be known as ‘robust peacekeeping’ or ‘peace enforcement’ began to be introduced into mandates for intervention forces (under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter). This meant that the intervening group would use their force strength and the threat of force (but limited actual use of force) to deter aggressors and maintain peace.

But adapting to changes was slow, and willingness to actually contribute to such forces was weak, such that despite being provided with strengthened mandates, forces were rarely provided with adequate means to carry out the mandate. Despite having the mandate to protect their mission, their freedom of movement, and to protect civilians, for example, often they did not have the force strength, weaponry or logistics to realistically fulfil their mandate (Hawkins, 2004: 67-116).

This was rarely a problem in cases where states (or coalitions of states) were authorised to lead their own forces (rather than placing them under UN command) in peace enforcement missions, such as theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) in post-conflict Bosnia, or Australia in East Timor.

In rare cases, the UN Security Council has also authorised states to use enforcement action (essentially unlimited use of aggressive force) to achieve a particular objective, such as ejecting Iraq from Kuwait or ejecting the military junta from Haiti. In terms of airlift, logistics and force strength, only the wealthiest countries generally have the capacity to carry out and maintain interventions beyond simple small-scale peacekeeping operations.

Below is a table looking at the differences in the types of military interventions from the perspectives of consent of the parties, impartiality (maintaining good relations with the parties or ensuring the implementation of the mandate), force level deployed and the use of force authorised. The area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is a ‘grey area’, and the situation and measures used are often unclear and may change depending on events and the judgment of the commanders on the ground.

Agenda-setting refers to the process by which certain influential groups in society decide which issues are important to them and that they feel need to be dealt with. ‘Actors’ (an entity which plays an identifiable role in society) in society have ‘agendas’ (a set of prioritized issues for discussion or action), and agenda-setting is the process by which they are ‘made’. Agendas of this nature are generally not written down as structured documents with issues numbered in order of perceived importance that is then published for all to see, they are preferences that may be measured (or assumed) through the words and actions of the groups over a period of time.

Who is on top of the Agenda Setting?

So who are these actors and how are their agendas made? Mainstream research on agenda setting began with studies on how the ‘public’ agenda is influenced by the ‘media’ agenda, with the public being the general population and the media the print and broadcast press.

Studies found that when asked what they thought were the most important issues facing their country, their answers very closely reflected the patterns of media coverage at that time. This does not necessarily mean that the media are influencing the way the public thinks, but simply that it influences the topics or issues that they think about, their agendas. As Bernard Cohen famously stated, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about”.

So if the media is playing a major role in telling the people what to think about, then how do the media decide what their own agenda is? Are they forming their agendas independently? Actual events, personal experience, and preconceived notions of what they think is important to influence the media (editors and reporters), but research has revealed other factors. Studies suggest that the media `index’ the news according to government viewpoints (Mermin, 1999).

Particular with regards to foreign affairs, it is simply cheaper and faster to discuss issues with one’s own government, and there is a perceived ‘reliability of the source. A sense of nationalism among the press also means they are more likely to view the world through the lens of their own country. This gives the agenda of policymakers’ considerable influence over the media agenda

On the other hand, the public and the media both have been shown to project influence on the policy agenda. In democracies, many sections of the policymakers are elected and must, to some extent; deal with issues on the public agenda if they are to be re-elected. Policymakers are also likely to be the target of demonstrations or lobbying from certain sections of the public, such as special interest groups or powerful corporations.

If not through demonstrations or lobbying, policymakers may learn of the agendas of the public agenda through public opinion polls, or through the media. One prominent view of the role of the media is that it should act as a watchdog, to keep a watchful eye on the government and to make noise if it does something wrong (another view is that it should act as a mirror, objectively reflecting reality). By concentrating on a particular issue in its coverage, the media can force the policymakers to pay attention to that issue (although it may not be necessarily able to influence the outcome).

Actors in the Agenda Setting

Actors in the agenda-setting Process against conflict

The above discussion has given us a rough idea as to who the actors are in the agenda-setting process. We have seen the public, the media and thepolicymakers. Before we go into more detail it is also possible to add on another actor, the academia. Although the academic community may appear less powerful than the other actors, they do have a significant role to, play in agenda-setting, particularly as it relates to conflict and conflict resolution, not least because they are responsible for the recording of human history.

It is important to note here that agenda-setting research has been developed and applied in relation to a number of varied situations, including elections, domestic economic policy, social welfare, defense spending and foreign military intervention, to name but a few, and its application varies depending on the subject to which it is applied. In this course, the process of agenda-setting will be used only as it applies to foreign conflict and conflict-resolution, and often conflict in which the country in question is not directly involved.

Actors are not single and homogenous groups. Policymakers, for example, include international organisations as well as the executive and legislative branches of individual governments and their bureaucracies. Speaking of the media agenda does not suggest that all media groups come together and hammer out an agenda of issues for consideration. The media includes many different corporations in many different countries, each with their own management structures. The public is also made up of a variety of potentially conflicting groups. Discussing agenda-setting in this sense will inevitably involve certain generalisations.

Below is a summary of the actors that we will be looking at and some of their component groups:

Policymakers:international organisations, national governments (executive branch, legislative branch, bureaucracy)

Media:Print, broadcast, internet

Public:General public, interest groups, corporations, NGOs

Academia:university academics, research institute academics, specialists

Inter-Actor Relations

We have already seen that the agendas of at least some of these actors are not necessarily independent of the others. If we look more closely, we will see that there are ways in which each actor is influenced by each of the other actors in some ways in the formation of their agendas regarding conflict and conflict resolution. The effect may be large or small, but there is certainly a linkage. In the final analysis, agendas are the product of real-life events, filtered through the lens of internal organisational dynamics and influenced by the agendas of other actors, and even the individual experiences and interpersonal relations of those working within actor groups.

Below is a simple model, which shows that all of the four actors influence each other within the boundaries of the real-world events The details of how these agendas influence each other in regards to conflict and conflict resolution will be dealt with in each of the following units, but below is a brief overview.

The policy agenda is influenced by the media agenda because policymakers themselves are direct consumers of the media, and to a certain degree they believe that the media is a reflection of public opinion. Policymakers are also the target of media interviews and emotive appeals, and are forced to respond to media criticism, sometimes in real-time.

With the power to elect, and the right to demonstrate, petition and lobby, the general public also influence the policymakers. Interest groups and corporations provide a great deal of campaign funds to politicians, which also gives them leverage. Private citizens can also establish NGOs, including advocacy groups, or aid groups through which policymakers often channel emergency relief resources.

Academics may influence policymakers when employed as advisors and consultants. They may also provide detailed unsolicited policy recommendations or appeals, and their work in academic publications or periodicals may be read by policymakers.

The media agenda is influenced by the policy agenda because, as noted above, policymakers are a key source of information for the media on foreign events. Even if not through direct interviews, policymakers formally and informally release information to the media. They may also attempt to limit access by the media to information on foreign conflicts.

The public are also in a position to influence the media, considering that the general public are the main consumers of news, and that corporations are the main consumers of advertising vital to media revenue. NGOs in conflict zones may also use the media to draw attention to the conflict and their activities. Academics can influence the media because they are frequently used as sources in interviews, articles and op-ed pieces. They may also use the media to draw attention to the results of their studies.

The public agenda is influenced by the policy agenda in a number of different ways. The general public listens to what policymakers say (although usually through the media), corporations are provided with subsidies and diplomatic assistance in their foreign ventures, and NGOs are often largely reliant on government funds for emergency relief projects in conflict zones.

The media have a great influence on the public because the public rely almost solely on the media to provide them with information on foreign events. The media also influence NGOs because where the media focus on a conflict, funding for their activity is likely to follow. Academics influence the public because of their teachings at universities, and a certain proportion of the work they produce is for public consumption, including textbooks.

Academics are influenced by the policy agenda because many think tanks are funded (or at least subsidised by) the government, as are public universities. This does not necessarily mean that the outcome of the research is controlled, but funding opportunities often depend on the subject matter.

Academics are also influenced by the media because they are consumers of news and have a certain reliance on the media for source material, which may also influence their research choices. The public influences academia because a certain proportion of academics do pursue popularity, aiming to produce material that will sell well to public consumers.

Oddly enough, as we will see in the units ahead when all of the internal dynamics and external influences have done their work and agendas are formed, the agendas of the majority of the actors tend to show a high level of similarity, despite their diverse interests, backgrounds and goals. One of the most striking of these similarities is that almost invariably, conflicts in Africa are given a low priority on these agendas, despite their scale and level of humanitarian emergency.

We have seen in the previous topic trends suggesting that policymakers outside the continent attach a low priority to conflicts in Africa on the whole. This topic aims to investigate why. The decisions of policy makers are formed, to a certain extent, according to internal dynamics, but they are also subject to influences from other actors.

Internal Dynamics

At the level of international organisations, we can focus on the decision in conflicts resolution within the UN Security Council and also on the agencies involved in providing humanitarian aid. We have already discussed how the decisions of the Security Council are the result of compromise and power politics among its members, but how does this work? The five permanent countries on the Council have the power of veto, and thus can unilaterally reject decisions that they feel do not serve their interests.

They can even veto the placing of an item on the Council agenda for discussion. There may also be a certain amount of behind-the-scenes ‘trading’ over issues, country A will allow an initiative of country B in return for country B supporting an initiative raised by country A. Non-permanent members can also wield some influence if their” diplomatic capabilities are strong, but this can be difficult when their term is only two years.

Perhaps more importantly, in the case of conflicts in Africa, where there is a lack of interest among members in general, it is extremely difficult to generate support for timely and substantive initiatives. Without a dedicated leader to raise the issue and see it through to the adoption of effective decisions, issues simply do not rise up the agenda.

Basically, it is donors who decide how much money will be given to alleviate suffering in a particular emergency, but it is the agencies that decide the amount of the appeal. Although these appeals supposedly are determined based on needs assessments, they appear to be, more often than not, supply driven rather than demand driven.

Major donors tend to give large amounts of aid after political change that they wish to support, hence the massive amounts of aid to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq immediately following regime changes seen as favourable to the donors. This is ‘good for business’ for the aid agencies, who welcome the income for their activities. Agencies are also sensitive to which emergencies are unlikely to attract attention and funding, and therefore find themselves forced to draft ‘realistic’ appeals.

Some steps have been taken to improve this situation somewhat, however, with the introduction in 2005 of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which seeks to pool resources that are not earmarked or responses to specific appeals, allowing OCHA greater freedom in responding to neglected emergencies.

At a country level, decision in conflicts resolution mechanisms are highly complex, and their nature depends highly on the individual country in question. In general, the decision-making process in responding to conflict depends largely on three main actors: the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the bureaucracy.

Their common mandate is to protect their own national interest, though the perception of the actors of what exactly this entails may be quite diverse. The level of power in each case depends on the political system, the perceived importance of the issue and the level of agreement among these actors. In some instances, the personal dedication to a particular cause by an individual within these groups can have considerable influence.

Overall, geopolitics is a major factor in much of the decision making of policymakers, how important is a region strategically, and how much does it affect the security and economic interests of the nation? The relatively high strategic relevance of Africa during the Cold War saw a significant decline in the 1990s. but it did not mean that all interest was lost.

There are a number of forces at work in this regard: African oil makes up a significant part of Western consumption (although it is concentrated in a few countries); the US desire to contain hostile Sudan influenced much of its policies on the continent; France feels a need to protect its influence and interests on the continent, particularly from Anglophone domination; and China is expanding its trade promotion to meet the needs of its growing economy. But because of the overall decline in strategic relevance of the continent, most of the powerful states appear content to remain on the sidelines as long as they can protect their limited interests.

Relations with other states also have an impact. Some policymakers may be pressured by other states to do something in response to conflict. This may be because initiating states need to attract the support of other states to improve the effectiveness of their action, enhance the legitimacy of their position, or to reduce spread the risk in the case that the results are less than desirable.

This may lead to a ‘bandwagon effect’, where others feel compelled to raise their voices or participate in action of some form out of peer pressure. The reputation of their state is an issue for policymakers. Policymakers are typically, however, risk averse, and will be hesitant to engage in any action in which the risks (to their troops, finances or reputation) are high. Thus, the low geopolitical importance of Africa means that there is less incentive to be proactive.

Within national governments, there may be significant divergence of views on how to respond to certain issues. While ministries of foreign affairs have traditionally dominated issues of foreign affairs, increasing globalisation has meant that more actors are becoming involved and there are more channels for communication on issues of foreign affairs. Executive policymakers may become targets of pressure from opposition parties, from politicians with strong personal views, from ministries (particularly foreign affairs and defense), and from government-run aid agencies.

The ministry of defense may be willing to contribute troops to an intervention in Africa, for example, but the foreign ministry, with other priorities, may view this as a waste of resources, something that is more trouble than it’s worth (Gordon, Miller and Wolpe, 1998: 16-17). The low strategic interest means there is less cohesion in policy, it is more difficult to build consensus for strategy and action within the branches of government.

Media Influence on decision in conflicts resolution

The media influence the decision-making process of the policymakers because in many ways they form the link between the policymakers and their constituencies. Rightly or wrongly, policymakers tend to view the media as the mouthpiece of public opinion. Policymakers considering a potential course of action in response to a conflict will most likely consider the possibility of media support for such action before making the decision.

More significantly, the tendency of the media to focus their collective attention on a single conflict and to utilise oversimplified and emotive reporting that clearly identifies ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ (as we will see in the following unit) also serves as pressure on policymakers to do something in response to conflict, even where there may be no threat or benefit for their own national interest. Where policymakers already have a clear policy set out, they are likely to resist such pressure, but where there is apathy or clashing opinions within the policymaking circle, the use of such sustained media pressure is likely to have an effect.

But pressure by the media to do something’ where there is no genuine interest, may result in piecemeal ‘actions by policymakers designed simply to alleviate the pressure, rather than actually contribute to conflict resolution. Such actions may be largely for show, with little impact on the ground. Furthermore, even though the media potentially have the power to force the policymakers to pay attention to a particular conflict, they rarely exercise this power with regards to conflicts in Africa (recent attention on Darfur is a rare exception), so their influence is somewhat irrelevant in Africa.

Public Influence

In procedural democracies (where the public has the power to punish and reward politicians at election time based on their actions and their promises) the public has influence over the policymakers through the ballot. But it is not only at election time when they can exert this influence (although at election time it may well be at its strongest).

The public can lobby, petition, or use other forms of advocacy, to encourage their representatives to act in a certain way. In large enough number they can even demonstrate on the streets if they feel strongly enough about an issue. In the case of a conflict or humanitarian crisis, the reputation of policymakers can be damaged through public disapproval if they remain idle. Policymakers may look not only at the levels of media coverage, but also at public opinion polls on any given situation.

Among public actors, certain interest groups may hold greater interest and greater power in influencing policymakers. Such groups include ethnic or religion-based groups (diasporas), as well as business lobbies. In the West, the Jewish lobby is particularly influential in encouraging policies favourable for Israel, largely because of the amounts of money it contributes to the campaign funds of politicians.

Lobby groups for Africa are less organised and less powerful. Sometimes pressure may come for action in opposite directions from different lobby groups. In the case of US policies on Sudan, for example, Christian lobby groups were pushing for greater pressure on the northern government to protect the Christian groups in the south, but at the same time, oil companies were lobbying for a more conciliatory stance to enable them to access oilfields in Sudan.

It is difficult to pin down, however, how much influence the public in general on, the policymakers, and conversely, how much the policymakers are influencing the public by utilising and manipulating public opinion to their advantage. The policymakers may also misread public opinion, especially if they are influenced by powerful interest groups that may have the minority opinion.

Furthermore, public interest is more likely to be primarily concerned with domestic issues rather than distant foreign conflicts. Foreign conflicts rarely become election issues unless their own country is involved. Africa in particular is usually seen as being distant from the interests of the Western public, unless they are substantially galvanised by media attention.

Academic Influence

Academics also have the power to influence policy makers. Experts in the field of international relations, politics and security (but outside the government) may be commissioned to conduct studies on security issues affecting their country or the interests of their country. They may conduct workshops and conferences on particular topics that bring in both academics and policymakers to debate on a particular foreign affairs topic. Policymakers involved in foreign affairs are also likely to read journals, and op-ed piece in the newspapers written by academics that are relevant to their activities.

Perhaps more importantly, specialists with academic backgrounds in international affairs are increasingly being drawn in by bureaucracies and governments to serve as consultants, advisors and other positions. Governments fund think tanks to encourage research in certain areas that will benefit the formulation of their policies. This gives academics a certain amount of influence. As a result of this process, there are a number of high profile policymakers who have come from academic backgrounds, including Sadako Ogata (former head of UNHCR), Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, and Condoleezza Rice (former and present US Secretaries of State).

Finally, policymakers may rise to positions due to ambition for power and influence, but they are also concerned about their legacy, i.e., how they, will be remembered in history (particularly during their final terms in office).

In this sense, it is not necessarily the active influence of academics on policymakers, but more the role itself of academics as the recorders of history that influences policymakers to attempt to contribute to the resolution of international issues for which they will be ‘remembered in a positive light. The decision of former US President George Bush senior to intervene in Somalia, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s recent rhetoric on Africa in general may be a reflection of such a concern for their legacy.

INTRODUCTION

The media is an actor in conflicts resolution that ‘speaks’ rather than ‘acts’. Its primary role in conflicts resolution is to discover and report on conflicts, informing other actors of their existence and keeping them updated with how the conflict is unfolding as well as how others are responding to it. It may adopt a ‘watchdog’ approach, exposing conflict and criticising other actors for not responding to stop it, or a ‘mirror’ approach, simply reporting the facts. This unit focuses on the perception of and response to conflict by the media, as well as looking at how the other actors influence the media in their coverage of conflict

RESPONSE TO CONFLICT

Perhaps the most obvious trend in the response of the media to foreign conflict is that there is so little of it. In some ways, this is understandable. There may be 20 or 30 conflicts ongoing in the world at any given time, but the amount of time available for a single television news program maybe only about 20 minutes (minus commercial breaks). The vast majority of this time is devoted to domestic news, and sports and weather must also be included.

On national news programs, there may only be room for 2 or 3 foreign news stories. The same can be said for radio news. Even on 24-hour news channels, the same stories are often repeated in the following program, and developments on previous stories are followed up on. Newspapers may have more space to deal with, but domestic news dominates.

Within the limited space for foreign news, only a portion of this will be about armed conflict, there are other international stories that don’t involve violence. This means that the amount of reporting on foreign conflicts is highly limited. Within this framework there are a number of trends in the response of the media to conflict that will be dealt with below.

Concentration On A Single Conflict

The media has a tendency to focus the limited time and space they have for covering conflict in foreign countries on just one or two conflicts at any given time.Conflictsappear to be ‘chosen’, or considered asnewsworthy, and extensive or saturation coverage is applied to following their progress.

Such coverage is likely to peak during the period of greatest violence, and then reduce as the violence subsides, and/or it is eclipsed by the next conflict. There May be a secondary conflict, one that receives a moderate amount of coverage compared to the ‘chosen’ conflict, but few other conflicts are likely to receive significant coverage, particularly^–in the broadcast media, where time is limited.

Looking at levels of media coverage in recent years, a clear pattern emerges. From late 1998, Kosovo was the central conflict dominating media attention. In late 1999 East Timor briefly emerged, and in 2000 limited fighting in Israel-Palestine became dominant. The terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001 connected to the attacks on Afghanistan, and then from 2003 to the present Iraq has been the central conflict in the media.

Throughout this time Israel-Palestine has been in the unique position of relatively constant coverage (even if second place behind the dominant conflict), and recently Darfur has become a secondary conflict in the media. One thing these leading conflicts have in common is either direct involvement of Western armed forces, or a strong Western interest in the conflict area.

In the first 3 months of 1999, for example, as a Western coalition prepared to attack Yugoslavia over the issue of Kosovo, the New York Times devoted roughly 15 percent of the space on its international pages to that conflict. In 2000, the amount of coverage CNN devoted to the conflict in Israel-Palestine was more than five times greater than the second-most covered conflict (in the Philippines).

In the same year, the coverage to that conflict in the Japanese newspaper, theYomiurwas also almost five times that of the second-most covered conflict (Hawkins, 2002). A study of the websites of three main global newswire services (AFP, AP and Reuters UK) in the first half of 2005 found that the top news items on their websites were dominated by news on USA, Iraq and Israel-Palestine (in that order). Combined, the coverage of these countries alone made up 36 percent of the top news items for AFP, 72 percent for AP, and 32 percent for Reuters UK.

Furthermore, with less time and space for coverage, the content must be simple, straightforward and easy to comprehend quickly.Conflictsare typically ‘framed’ in a morality play style, with one side determined as a ‘villain’ and the other side a ‘victim’, and ‘heroes’ are encouraged by this type of coverage to step forward and rescue the helpless victims.

As seen in the previous articles, the domination in the news of certainconflictsmeans that there is precious little time or space for the remaining 20 or 30 conflicts; going on throughout the world. If it is indeed a trend that theconflictsthat are chosen are those that involve Western powers directly or are close to their vital’ interests, then this means that in the post-Cold War environment, conflicts in Africa will not be chosen for heavy coverage. This appears to be the case.

Saturation coveragewas given to Somalia in the early 1990s with US involvement, and a certain amount of coverage was given to Rwanda towards the end of the genocide in 1994.

There was further coverage after the genocide, with the media focusing on the plight of the refugees in the camps in eastern Zaïre. This culminated in the approval and preparation for an intervention in 1996 to be led by Canada involving US troops, but coverage ended abruptly when Rwanda invaded pre-emptively and the intervention was called off. Coverage of African conflicts appeared to end there, with very low levels of coverage of conflicts in the DRC, Angola, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia-Eritrea. It was only in 2004 that a significant amount of coverage began to be given to African conflicts, Darfur in western Sudan, although it has failed to overcome Iraq as the dominant conflict in the media.

Statistics show this situation clearly. In the first three months of 1999, the combined coverage of the DRC, Angola, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia-Eritrea (all of which were experiencing significant resurgence of violence) on the international pages of the New York Times dropped from 6 percent in January to less than 1 percent in March, as coverage of Kosovo rose. In 2000, the BBC devoted 8.5 percent of its coverage to Africa, while CNN devoted 6 percent. On both stations, more coverage was given to violence in Zimbabwe targeting white farmers than to the large-scale conflict in the DRC. On the websites of the three mainnewswireservices studied in 2005, no African country was among the ten most covered countries.

Global Media Assimilation of African Conflict

There is a huge variety of news corporations in print, broadcast and even internet across a broad background of countries, languages and cultures. Wire services have offices in more than one hundred countries. Yet it would appear that news agendas are incredibly similar when it comes to foreign conflicts. That is, they give a high priority to the same ‘chosen’ conflict of the times; and very little coverage to the others, including Africa’s conflicts. This is not to suggest that the media corporations agree on these issues, but they increasingly tend to agree on which issues are important. This is seen not only in the Western world, but beyond, even in Africa itself.

There are significant regional differences: Asian media concentrate on Asian conflicts and events, and European media focus more on European conflicts and events. Language is also a factor, with English language media outlets more likely to report on English-speaking countries than French, and vice versa for French media outlets.

As a whole, however, coverage of African conflicts, and Africa in general, is seriously limited, as can be seen by the following table. One exception here is RFI (Radio France International), whose majority listeners are French-speaking Africans. The majority of listeners to BBC radio are also Africans, but this does not appear to be reflected in coverage on Africa in the news. To compensate for this, BBC radio broadcasts separate programs focusing on African issues.

Source: studies conducted by author

Interestingly, a similar trend of assimilation can also be seen within parts of Africa itself. That is, international news has a tendency to focus on the dominant conflicts of the times, and African conflicts are given limited attention. The Post newspaper of Zambia (the newspaper with then largest circulation in Zambia) is an interesting example. A count of the numbers of articles on the international pages over the course of 2004 revealed that the Middle East was the most covered region (24 percent of articles), followed by Africa (19 percent), the Americas (18 percent) and Asia and Europe (17 percent each).

The three most covered countries were the USA (13 percent), Iraq (12 percent) and Israel-Palestine (9 percent). The only African country featuring in the top ten was Sudan at number five. News on all eight of Zambia’s neighbours combines made up only 4 percent of the total coverage.

Local African Media Coverage

Zambia’s ZNBC television news revealed a similar trend. A historic peace deal in Sudan (between the north and south) signed on 9 January 2005 was not mentioned on the main evening news. International news on that day instead covered Palestinian elections and the mistaken bombing of a house by US forces in Iraq.

The first summit of the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council in January 2005 was also given little attention in Zambia, both on TV and radio. The aftermath of Palestinian elections, and of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, and even domestic US politics (the nomination for the Head of Homeland Security) were given more coverage. It should be noted, however, that there are other African media corporations that do, on the other hand, give significant coverage to African issues.

Groups with special interests in specific regions or issues, depending on their unity and financial strength are able to exert considerable influence on policymakers. They tend to draw their strength from the diasporas, or from those sharing religious beliefs. Do such interest groups exist for Africa in Western countries, and if they do, how responsive are they concerning conflict on the continent? A number of such organisations do exist, but their political power appears to be weak. This is notable considering the proportion of the diasporas in some of these Western countries. As many as 13 percent of Americans, for example, can trace their origins to Africa.

Actions by the Interest groups

Trans-Africa is a Washington-based organisation was established to increase the voice of African-Americans in US foreign policy, but it focused primarily on ending apartheid in South Africa. The organisation later turned its attention to Haiti and Nigeria, but it appeared to attract little mainstream support in the West(Berkeley, 2001: 88-90). Another group to note in the US was a loose grassroots coalition known as Liberia Watch, which successfully lobbied the USA for a 200-million-dollar aid package for Liberia.

Case of Christians response in conflict areas

Considerably stronger than these groups, however, are Christian lobby groups, who identify and attempt to aid Christians that they see are being persecuted by non-Christians. Their influence has been seen most in Sudan, and they have been both a major provider of aid in southern Sudan (controversial because it was also being used as a resource by south Sudanese rebel forces), and a political influence onpolicymakersengaged in the peace process in Sudan. It can be said, however, that the role of interest groups has been minimal in attracting sustained aid and political attention in the West for the majority of African conflicts.

Introduction

In many ways, it can be said that the Corporations Response to the conflicts in Africa has been much significant. This is not necessarily, however, a positive statement. The exploitation of extractable natural resources on the African continent has made the continuation of many African conflictspossible.

Weapons are sometimes exchanged directly for resources such as diamonds, and often the very existence of rebel groups and warlords depends on their ability to control these resources. Mining companies helped finance Joseph Kabila’s push to topple Mobutu in Zaire in exchange for mining contracts when his rebel forces were still 1,000 kilometres from Kinshasa.

The chain of exploitation of natural resources from extraction to the point of final sale is often long and complicated, and the major Western firm selling the product that is the reason for the initial extraction of the resource may or may not know that that resource is contributing to the perpetuation of conflict in Africa (see Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand, 2004: 28-29).

Cases of Corporations Response to the conflicts

It must be said, however, that the exploitation of such resources is highly profitable, and it would go against the business interests of these corporations to cease their involvement in such business, or to use their leverage to reduce the violence related to resource exploitation. One possible exception is the commitment shown by major diamond corporations not to buy ‘blood diamonds’ (mined from conflict zones), and their cooperation with the Kimberly process, which aims to ensure that the origin of all diamonds can be certified.

Western-based private security firms (a more politically acceptable term for what are essentially mercenaries) are also seen as having a role in conflicts in Africa. Such firms appeared to be instrumental in rescuing a government in began projects in the DRC, after having been attracted by the response to the volcanic eruptions in Goma. One Japanese NGO, with a minimal presence in Africa, sent emergency response teams to New Orleans in the USA to assist in the aftermath of hurricane damage there.

There are, however, a number of exceptions to this trend.Medecins Sans Frontieres(MSF) devoted the vast majority of its budget to crises in Africa, the top three recipients being Sudan, DRC and Angola in 2004. Less than one week after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, MSF estimated that they had received sufficient donations to cover their activities, and appealed to donors to instead donate for other pressing emergencies in Sudan, the DRC and Somalia.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) not only maintains humanitarian aid projects in the DRC, but has also contributed greatly to awareness on the conflict by conducting a series of mortality surveys, revealing the globally unequalled levels of humanitarian suffering in that country.

The general public response to conflict can be done by speaking about it with the people around them, petitioning their government, or taking to the streets to demand that attention be given to a conflict. They may also donate money to humanitarian aid appeals.

The Role of NGOs

Those who feel even more strongly may even organise themselves on a more permanent basis, forming NGOs (this will be dealt with below). For the general public, however, before speaking of their response to conflict, it is important to gauge their awareness of foreign conflict, i.e., do they even know that the conflict exists? Simply maintaining the existence of a conflict in one’s mind and recognising its relative importance is perhaps the first response that the general public can offer when responding to distant conflict.

Awareness ofAfrican conflictsamong the general public in the West appears to be very low. On the whole, opinion polls conducted by Western companies rarely mention the continent at all, which is a statement in itself. Domestic issues dominate the public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Centre, and the majority of polls that do deal with foreign issues cover Iraq and terrorism, with some on crises in Iran, North Korea, Israel and Lebanon.

The general public views on conflict resolution

January 2002 was the last time a poll includedAfrican conflicts(Somalia and Sudan) in its title, and this was regarding the use of American force in the world. Pew polls such as ‘What the World Thinks in 2002’ and ‘Views of a Changing World’ ask Africans what they think about political changes in Eastern Europe, American policies and ideas, and suicide bombing (Pew).

Surveys by World Public Opinion ask Congolese and Zimbabweans whether they think US troops should be withdrawn from Iraq and whether removing Saddam Hussein was the right thing to do or not (World Public Opinion). But polls do not ask what those inthe West think about conflict in the DRC, Angola or elsewhere in Africa, with the rare exception of possible intervention in Darfur.

A small survey conducted of 37 university students taking a course on war and peace in Australia found that the majority thought that the conflict in Israel-Palestine was most in need of resolution. Nine thought that that conflict was the deadliest in the world (the most common response). Only one could name the DRC as the deadliest conflict in the world, and 13 could not even name a single African conflict. Even in Africa, consciousness appears to be skewed’ When interviewed on BBC radio in 2004, an Angolan writer/poet, when asked what situation in the world concerned him most, responded that it was Palestine, because it had great problems that were ignored by the world.

Recent Western interventions in Kosovo and Iraq sparked anti-war protests and petitions. Large-scale protest and petitions for action in conflict situations that do not directly affect one’s own country are few and far between. Recent demonstrations in the West calling for action in Darfur are rare exceptions. There has not been significant public awareness on the Great Lakes region since the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in eastern Zaire in 1996.

The general public can also show its response to conflict through donations to aid organisations. The following table shows private donations made through OCHA to a number of recent emergencies. The greatest emergencies (in terms of humanitarian need) are in Africa, yet they are the least funded.

Private contributions to OCHA appeals: Jan 1999 – Jun 2003 (millions of US dollars)



Source: OCHAFinancial TrackingService